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Abstract: 
 
    This paper develops a critique of the standard principal-agent approach to 
corporate governance by developing the idea of a family based corporate governance 
system (FBS). FBS is  contrasted with the bank-led system (BLS) and equity market 
based system (EMS). Both BLS and EMS are closely associated with the dominant mode 
of corporate finance by banks and equity markets respectively. In the case of FBS, the 
financing can come from three different sources. Initially, family business is financed 
largely by internal funds. As the enterprise grows over time, the role of banks and outside 
equity becomes more prominent. However, the key difference between FBS as a 
governance system and BLS and EMS lies in the fact that neither the banks nor the equity 
markets ultimately control the family business groups. The control resides with the family 
groups in the final analysis.    
  The key hypothesis verified is that in economies at a lower stage of development 
FBS economizes on transactions costs. This holds especially when the share of external 
finance in the family businesses is low with corresponding low levels of agency costs. 
These factors help explain the successful performance of FBS during the Asian Miracle 
when specific government policies encouraged rapid industrialization.Theoretically, the 
standard principal-agent model seems to be inadequate in explaining completely the 
successes and failures of the FBS type of governance. A theory of firms as socially 
embedded organizations that respond to the needs of multiple stakeholders may be a 
better framework for studying the persistence of different types of governance structures--
- often in the same country. Normatively, the ability of the different governance structures 
to serve the needs of the different stakeholders must be assessed within such a framework. 
A  nonutilitarian, common good approach may be  more suitable for this purpose than the 
existing neoclassical utilitarian approach.This is also consistent with the “realist” 
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I.  Introduction 
 
   
 
 
  How can we frame the complex set of issues covered under the phrase “corporate 
governance”? Is there one overarching theory that covers all the diverse areas addressed 
by the phrase itself, or do we need a number of different theories? What should be the 
range and explanatory reach of a proper theory of corporate governance? The scandals of 
misgovernance in the US itself coming to light with the ENRON disaster gave new 
impetus to these questions which have practical significance going beyond the academic 
debates regarding corporate governance. Earlier in Asia, the financial crisis of the late 
1990s served the same purpose. However, the overwhelming advice with a few 
exceptions
1 then was to follow the stockmarket driven model. To sketch the implications 
even in a rough fashion, we need to delve into at least two different ways in which 
corporate governance can be conceptualized. 
         Corporate governance in a narrow sense addresses the fundamental microeconomic 
issue of how the managers of the firm are induced by banks, equity markets, or other 
mechanisms to act in the best interests of its shareholders and hence to maximize the 
discounted present value of the firm. In a wider sense, corporate governance can or 
should address a whole host of issues for multiple stakeholders--- ranging from efficiency 
and equity to the promotion of economic and political freedom. Recently, Iwai(1999) has 
created a framework distinguishing between the realist and nominalist approaches that 
can address many of the larger questions and meta-questions about corporate governance. 
   The present paper  tries to present a preliminary conceptual framework consistent 
with the realist approach within which to frame the salient issues regarding Asian 
corporate governance. An attempt is also made to address some significant issues for 
                                                            
1 See Khan, Haider(1999a), “Corporate Governance in Asia: Which Road to Take?”, Paper presented at the 
high level symposium at ADBI, Tokyo, Japan, December. 
Khan, Haider(1999b), “Corporate Governance of Family Businesses in Asia: What’s Right and What’s 
Wrong?ADBI Working Paper No. 3, Tokyo, Japan. 
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reforming corporate governance in East Asia.
2 Finally, the limits of the most popular 
theoretical  approach based on the agency costs are also explored. It is argued that a 
complete explanation for the successes and the failures of the family- based system of 
governance requires a somewhat different model than the one starting from the 
assumption of atomistic, utility maximizing agents. This alternative approach should also 
be able to explain the persistence of different corporate governance structures --- often 
within the same country. 
It appears that the standard approaches that look at the firm as simply a nexus of 
contracts cannot completely account for the particularities of the relationship types of 
corporate governance found in East Asia. Therefore, this paper extends Berglöf’s (1997) 
two-fold classification of corporate governance structure to a threefold one by analyzing 
family-based corporate governance structures.
3 Since large family business groups are 
quite prevalent in East Asian crisis economies, their corporate governance structures 
would seem to be of immediate relevance. The challenge, however, is to link this 
structure analytically to the two other types that can be called Bank-Led
4 and Equity 
Market-Based corporate governance systems.
5 Only by making the analytical links clear 
can one begin to consider the policy issues raised by the Asian crisis as well as by 
transition from one type of governance to another. This paper is organized as follows. The 
following section presents a new conceptual framework and typology including family-
based corporate governance. Some important aspects, including financing, monitoring 
and performance of family businesses are discussed in section three. Next, in section four, 
                                                            
2 It should also be mentioned here that this paper is concerned about privately owned and controlled firms 
only. Many of the conceptual issues discussed here are, of course, similar. But SOEs form a distinct 
category and their governance should be analyzed separately. I am grateful to Sadrel Reza for helpful 
discussions with regards to SOEs. 
3 As Suehiro (1993, 1997) correctly points out "[t]he body of research … confronting directly the 
phenomenon referred to as "family business" is surprisingly small in quantity and rather shallow in its 
theoretical consideration of the subject matter" (1993, p. 379). Within the scanty theoretical tradition, 
starting with Berle and Means (1932) and especially in Chandler (1977) the passing away of family 
enterprise and the rise of ’managerial firm’ has been accepted as an indisputable stylized fact. In reality, 
however, family-based enterprises and family control have been remarkably obdurate, especially in Asia. 
See also the interesting work by Okazaki(2001) on the role of Zaibatsu in pre-war Japan. 
4 Prof. Miwa at Tokyo University has argued, based on his empirical research that in Japan, equity markets, 
rather than banks played a crucial role in financing (and perhaps governance also). This interesting and 
controversial research counters the traditional bank-based view of finance during early phases of economic 
development--- at least in the case of Japan. See Miwa nad Ramseyer (2000). For their views on the 
Japanese Keiretsu, see Miwa and Ramseyer(2002).   5 
the transactions costs related to the institutional environment in which the family 
businesses operate are considered. In particular, the existence and enforcement of 
property rights laws are examined in order to see how these contribute to the incentive 
structures and performance of family businesses in East Asia. The final section presents 
some tentative conclusions and some suggestions for areas of future analytical and 
empirical research.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 These terms are defined with greater precision in the next section. See also Rajan and Zingales (1998) and 
Zingales (1997) for a discussion of closely related conceptual issues. Kim and Rhee (1999) present some 
interesting empirical results.   6 
II.  A New Conceptual Framework and Typology: Family Based Corporate 
Governance 
 
  It should be realized that despite a great push by its proponents it is not obvious a 
priori that there is only one kind or normatively, one “best” governance system Even 
before the crisis in Asia extensive debate was taking place in Europe, US and Japan about 
the relative merits of different type of corporate governance systems. Broadly speaking, 
two general types of corporate governance structures have been discussed. 
  The first type can be called a shareholder or equity market-based governance 
model of the Anglo-American type (EMS). This is usually contrasted with the continental 
European or Japanese type stakeholder or relationship model. In the second type (for 
example, the Japanese main bank system) banks play a key role of monitoring the 
performance of corporations. Therefore, this type of governance structure could be called 
a bank-led governance system (BLS). Note that BLS can either be a Japanese style main 
bank system as mentioned above, or a German type of universal banking system.
6 
However, the BLS and EMS  are not the only two possible types of corporate governance 
systems.  
In both Northeast and Southeast Asia there is a preponderance of family-based 
firms that are not necessarily controlled by banks or by equity markets. Nevertheless they 
do operate as economic entities within the context of a relationship-based system. Thus 
family-based corporate governance system (FBS) can constitute a third type of corporate 
governance.
7 A first attempt at theorization of the FBS type of governance was made in 
Khan(1999a, b) along the lines described in table 2.1 below. However, it should be noted 
                                                            
6 It should be pointed out that in order for the BLS to be an effective system of governance at all the banks 
must have the incentives and capacity to monitor the firms to which they lend. This clearly depends on the 
location (in a functional sense) and political power of the banks in the overall financial system. As some 
researchers (e.g. Suehiro for Thailand, Sato for Indonesia and Nam for South Korea) have pointed out in 
many Asian countries the banks themselves are family-based or are under the influence of government 
which may be more motivated by short-run political pressures rather than long-run economic interests. 
Clearly, under such circumstances banks are neither well-governed themselves, nor can they govern their 
debtor firms. One crucial precondition for moving to BLS is, therefore, to have effective governance of the 
banks themselves so that their position as monitors become viable. 
7 As mentioned earlier, even the family-based corporates are relatively little studied. Hence, it is not 
surprising that almost no attention has been devoted to a systematic study of their structure, conduct and 
performance until recently. Recent work by Khanna and Palepu (1996, 1999) on India and by Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan and Lang (1998, 1999) and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1999) are important beginnings of 
serious research in this area.   7 
that the agency problems developing at different stages of the FBS also are incomplete 
characterizations of the system as such from a social point of view of multiple 
stakeholders.More on this will be discussed later. For the moment, let us ask the 
following comparative question. 
Given this threefold division,
8  what are the relevant dimensions in which these 
systems can be compared and contrasted? Berglöf (1997) developed a set of criteria to 
answer this question for comparing EMS and BLS types of corporate governance. In 
addition to Berglöf's original criteria for comparing the BLS and EMS, I have introduced 
here two additional features related specifically to corporate governance. The first is 
monitoring of non-financial enterprises by the system, i.e. how the managers of 
corporations are monitored by outside financiers such as banks and shareholders. This 
type of governance is intimately associated with how corporations are financed, i.e., 
corporate finance. Such monitoring by the firms’ financiers is clearly an important 
function of the financial system. Secondly and more generally, the issue of self-
monitoring needs to be addressed. This issue is particularly relevant to family business 
groups in which ownership and management are not clearly separated. This applies 
equally to both financial and non-financial firms. Table 2.1 compares and contrasts the 
BLS and EMS types of corporate governance. For reasons explained in the next 
paragraph we consider FBS in a separate setting in Table 2.2. 
                                                            
8 It should be mentioned that other forms of classification are also possible. For example, Lehman (1997) 
offers a six-fold classification comprising of the Rheinal, Mediterranean, Japanese Keiretsu. The Korean 
Chaebol, the Chinese bamboo network and the Anglo-American systems. It can be seen that most of his 
categories are sub-species of FBS and BLS systems. Thus, his classification is consistent with the above 
threefold classification with the exception that his conceptualization minimizes the growth potential of what 
he quaintly calls 'the Chinese bamboo network'. It is, of course, entirely proper and desirable to look into 
the sub-categories of FBS if and when necessary. In this paper Chaebols are treated as one such special sub-
category of FBS. The key point is that the Anglo-American type EMS type of governance structure is not 
the only or normatively “the best” one in an obvious sense.   8 
Table 2.1: Comparing Equity Market-Based and Bank-Led System of Corporate 
Governance  
 
Type of Corporate Governance System   
Equity Market-Based 
System (EMS) 
Bank-Led System (BLS) 
 









Large, highly liquid 
 
Not necessarily small but less liquid than 
EMS 
 




























Strong for close creditors but applied 
according to a “contingent governance 
structure” (Aoki) 
 
Dominant agency conflict 
 
Shareholders vs management 
Banks vs. investors 
Workers may be important stakeholders as 
in Aoki’s model of the Japanese firm 
 




Limited, but less so than in the case of 
FBS 
 










Potentially important; but possible 
systemic crisis may postpone bankruptcies 
 
Monitoring of non-financial enterprises 
(NFE)* 
Can be done through interlocking 
directorships, but equity market and threat 
of takeovers are the most important 
mechanisms 
Mixed; with adequate regulations that are 
enforced and stable intra-group 
shareholding monitoring can be effective 




Possible; but the mechanisms above apply 
for the most part 
Possible, with oversight by government 
and members of the group 
Potential for abuse 
 
*Note: NFE is clearly a large but special category. However, frequently in the literature on corporate governance the governance of 




Before presenting the characteristics of the FBS type of corporate governance in 
table 2.2 below, it may be useful to define family businesses more carefully. According to 
Suehiro (1993) the family business can be thought of " … as a form of enterprise in which   9 
both ownership and management are controlled by a family kinship group, either nuclear 
or extended, and the fruits of which remain inside that group, being distributed in some 
way among its members." (p. 378). 
  Suehiro draws his inspiration from Chandler (1977) who defines family business 
in the following way: 
 
In some firms the entrepreneur and his close associates (and their 
families) who built the enterprise continued to hold the majority of 
stock. They maintained a close personal relationship with their 
managers, and they retained a major say in top management decisions, 
particularly those concerning financial policies, allocation of resources, 
and the selection of senior managers. Such a modern business enterprise 
may be termed an entrepreneurial or family one, and an economy or 
sectors of an economy dominated by such firms may be considered a 
system of entrepreneurial or family capitalism. (p. 9, quoted by Suehiro 
(1993) p. 378) 
 
In discussing family business in East Asia in this paper the emphasis will be on 
control and de facto control rights more than formal ownership. Claessens, Djankov, Fan 
and Lang (1998, 1999) and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1998, 1999) have pointed out 
in their recent studies of corporate control in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand two important features of industrial organization in East Asia. These are:  
a)  families have control over the majority of corporations 
b)  such control is also magnified "… through the use of pyramid structures, 
cross-holdings and deviations from one-share-one-vote rules" (Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan and Lang, 1999, p. 3) 
 
In appendix 1 the ownership structure for Thai corporations illustrates the first 
point. In appendix 2 the immediate control/ultimate cash flow rights diagram of the Lotte 
group, as calculated by Claessens et al. demonstrates point (b) above. 
 
The evidence gathered so far demonstrates that ultimate control of the corporate 
sector in East Asia is, on the whole, family-based. One study shows that “ …16.6% and 
17.1% of total market capitalization in Indonesia and the Philippines respectively can be 
traced to the ultimate control of a single family (the Suhartos and the Ayalas).” It goes on   10
to point out that the top 10 families in Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines have more 
than fifty percent of the market capitalization.
9 
 
In the following table 2.2 a qualitative description of the FBS system is given. The 
reader should note that the relevant categories for comparison across the rows in this table 
are exactly the same as for BLS and EMS. In the next section a more detailed analysis of 
FBS is attempted with the help of some quantitative information and specific references 
to family-based corporations and corporate groups (e.g. CP Group in Thailand and 
Lucky-Goldstar Group in Korea). 
                                                            
9 Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1999), “Who Controls East Asian Corporations”, p. 3   11
Table 2.2: Description of Family-Based System of Corporate Governance 
 
Type of Corporate Governance System   
Family-Based System (FBS) 
 
Share of control-oriented finance 
High initially, but may vary as family groups 




Small, less liquid 
 














Weak for outsiders 
 
Creditor rights 
Strong for close creditors 
Weak for arm's length creditors 
 
Dominant agency conflict 
 
Controlling vs minority investors 
 













Monitoring of non-financial enterprises (NFE) 
Mixed; in the presence of strong regulations 
and government vigilance monitoring could be 
efficient. However, the presence of moral 
hazard and possibility of bail-outs could lead 
to lax monitoring. 
 
Self-monitoring 
Initially, self-monitoring is effective. At later 
stages there is a strong tendency for insiders to 
be predatory towards outsiders. Could still be 
efficient but efficiency depends on the 
performance of owner-managers. 
 
   12
The reader should note that both BLS and EMS are closely associated with the 
dominant mode of corporate finance by banks and equity markets respectively. In the case 
of FBS in East Asia, the financing can come from three different sources. First, FBS, 
especially in initial stages of development of family businesses could be financed 
internally for a large part. Second, as the enterprise grows over time, the role of banks 
becomes more prominent. Third, at some stage - perhaps overlapping with the second, i.e. 
bank financing - outside equity may become the most significant source of corporate 
finance. However, the key difference between FBS as a governance system and BLS and 
EMS lies in the fact that neither the banks nor the equity markets ultimately control the 
family business groups. The control resides with the family (or families) in the final 
analysis. As we shall see, this may not be without economic rationale, but ultimately FBS 
can run into trouble as well. This has been demonstrated with an insidious vividness by 
the Asian crisis. 
 
As alluded to above table 2.2 is only a qualitative description of the FBS corporate 
governance system. Although it facilitates comparisons and contrasts with the other 
systems, we need to go into more detail with the help of as much quantitative information 
as is available at this point. With this in mind, the following section presents some 
important aspects, including financing, monitoring and performance of family businesses 
with special emphasis on asymmetric information and monitoring aspects of the FBS type 
of governance system. 
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III.  Financing, Monitoring and Performance of Family Businesses 
 
Without being exhaustive, the essential aspects of the family-based system can be 
discussed under the following five headings: 
 
1.  Extent of family controlled corporations in East Asia 
2.  The dominant modes of financing 
3.  The key information asymmetries and agency conflicts 
4.  Problems of monitoring family businesses 
5.  Investment and capital accumulation by the corporations 
 
These five aspects have been chosen because these are the most significant from 
the point of view of determining the problem of corporate governance in East Asia for 
family controlled corporations in practice. The first four are the most important elements 
of corporate governance structure, while investment and capital accumulation can be seen 
as the most important performance indicator for a late industrializing economy. 
 
 
1.  Ownership and Control: 
 
1.1 Overall picture of ownership and control 
 
Although empirical evidence is not widely available, at least for the companies 
covered in World Scope database, it is possible to calculate the percentage of total market 
capitalization controlled by families in East Asia. 
 
According to a recent study by Claessens, et al., at the World Bank, the share of 
top 10 families in the total market capitalization in Indonesia in 1996 was 57.7 percent. 
For Philippines and Thailand this share was 52.5 and 46.2 percent respectively. For Korea 
the share of top 15 families was 38.4 percent and for Malaysia 28.3 percent. 
   14
This picture of concentrated ownership of corporations by a few (usually a 
number between 5 and 10) family groups is supported by individual country studies by 
Suehiro for Thailand, Sato for Indonesia, Taniura for Taipei,China and Korea and Koike 
for Philippines.  
 
1.2 Ownership and control in the financial sectors 
 
 
Most of the private commercial banks and finance companies in Thailand are 
controlled by family business groups. For example, the top bank in Thailand, Bangkok 
Bank Limited, is controlled by the Sophompanitch family. The Farmer’s Bank, which is 
the second-largest bank is, controlled by the Lamsum family. Of the 15 private domestic 
commercial banks and 53 finance or security companies before the crisis in Thailand, the 
great majority were controlled by the family groups. In Philippines and Indonesia also a 
similar system prevailed. In Indonesia before the crisis, of the 144 private commercial 
banks  many were controlled by combinations of family groups. In Korea, there are 
explicit, fairly low limits (15% for regional banks and only 4% for all other banks) on 
ownership of stocks by a family or Chaebols in a particular company. Hence the formal 
degree of ownership is low, but control can still be exercised through member companies 
who own stocks, deviation from one-share-one-vote rule, etc.  It is not known to what 
extent this is true in the financial sector, but the following table for the top Chaebols 
showing the extent of overall control by insiders is revealing.  
 
   15
Table 3.1: Ownership of Korean business groups by insiders 
(percent of common shares held) 
 
Business group  Founder  Relatives  Member  Total 
     Companies 
 
 
Hyundai 3.7 12.1  44.6 60.4 
Samsung 1.5 1.3  46.3 49.3 
LG 0.1  5.6  33.0  39.7 
Daewoo 3.9 2.8  34.6  41.4 
Sunkyong 10.9 6.5 33.5  51.2 
Sangyong 2.9  1.3  28.9  33.1 
Hanjin 7.5  12.6  18.2  40.3 
Kia 17.1  0.4  4.2  21.9 
 







After an initial period of internal financing (Koike, 1993) many East Asian 
family-based businesses developed into highly leveraged firms. In 1996, Korea was the 
economy with the highest debt/equity ratio of 3.54. Thailand was the next with a ratio of 
2.36. In some sectors such as construction the debt/equity ratio was double the national 
average. What is significant is that despite high debt, the BLS type of governance did not 
come into play. The lack of effective bank monitoring in the face of such seemingly high 
level of debt much of which is owed to the banks is indeed a puzzle. Some plausible 
explanations are discussed in the subsection on monitoring 
 
Furthermore, in case of Korea, the overall share of family-owned equity is 
formally quite small as figure 3.1 below shows. The share of equity outside of families is 
also small (16%) but much larger than that of the families. It is surprising that seemingly 
there is no control by outside shareholders. Table 3.1 suggests a plausible hypothesis.   16
Actual control by the family groups far exceeded the formal ownership of chaebols, 




Source: Yuji Akaba, Florian Budde Jungkiu Choi, "Restructuring South Korea's Chaebol", The McKinsey 




3.  Information asymmetries and agency issues: 
 
In case of FBS, initially the family members act as owner-managers. Then as the 
firm grows and is professionalized, there is still close monitoring of managers by the 
owners. When the family business is almost entirely financed "internally" (including 
financing from relatives and other informal networks, as in the case of overseas Chinese), 
and remains limited in scope and scale, the asymmetry of information and the consequent 
problem of adverse selection and moral hazard between the owners and managers is not 
usually very severe. This is true largely because there is no effective separation between 
ownership and management. 
 
However, as family business grows there arises a conflict between the owner-
managers and the financiers (whether banks or outside shareholders). This can give rise to 
possible failure of FBS due to private risk taking not validated by market results (moral 
hazard), for example investment in the wrong projects. It could also lead to the selection 
of the more risky (wrong) borrowers (adverse selection). Therefore, the FBS system 
works well when self-monitoring is present, or when banking and security market 
Total assets of 30 largest chaebol
Shareholder's equity
(16% = 67 trillion won)
Family-owned (1.4%)
100% = 408 trillion won
Fig. 3.1: Chaebol's average equity shareholding   17
(prudential and other) regulations and an effective legal system make the misuse of 




As mentioned previously, the self-monitoring incentives for FBS may exist only at 
an earlier phase of growth. As Suehiro (1993) points out, following Nakagawa, “the 
development of family business could be the result of a rational choice by an entrepreneur 
in a backward or a latecomer nation, where the government had intentionally promoted 
industrialization”. 
 
In all the East Asian economies this apparently had been the case. Many family 
enterprises, particularly under their founder-owners, showed tremendous flexibility 
during the period of accelerated growth. It is likely that family enterprises succeeded in 
economizing on scarce managerial resources. It must have been nearly impossible to 
function flexibly and effectively without constant self-monitoring, both ex ante and ex 
post, at this stage. 
 
In general, the problem of monitoring really arises once the firm acquires large 
external financing. It may become particularly acute when firms develop into 
conglomerates, investing in areas where they did not have much experience or expertise. 
It is difficult also to monitor such activities from outside because expertise may be 
lacking on the part of the external financiers as well. Even with a market for corporate 
takeovers this problem may persist (Hikino, 1997). In case of banks as monitors there is 
also the problem of who monitors the monitors.
10 In fact, this last question brings us back 
to the problem of understanding the origins of the banking crisis and corporate 
governance problems in Asia with which this paper began. Further research must help us 
understand better whether banks failed to monitor effectively because of state interference, 
or rapid deregulation, or influence from family businesses, or a combination of all these 
factors.   18
 
5. Corporate investment, accumulations and growth: 
 
If the end of corporate governance is to enhance efficiency, then the right quality 
and quantity of investment in the appropriate sectors should be the right strategy for the 
firm. In these regards, the East Asian corporations registered impressive quantitative 
growth rates. For example, between 1988 and 1996 the median growth rate for a large 
sample of listed companies in Korea was 13.6 percent. Thailand’s mostly family-based 
corporations showed an even more impressive rate of capital accumulation over the same 
period at 13.8 percent per year. Indonesian corporations were close behind at 12.7 percent. 
The sample includes both financial and non-financial firms. It would appear that mainly 
as a result of massive accumulation of capital, both types of firms grew rapidly. The 
earlier studies of family business groups such as Salim Group in Indonesia (Sato, 1993), 
Lucky Goldstar Group in Korea (Koike, 1993), Samsung in Korea (Khan, 1998, 
forthcoming) and CP Group in Thailand (Suehiro, 1993) have pointed out how family 
firms rapidly grew and diversified. 
 
However, quite often the motive for diversification was to protect and enhance 
family fortunes, rather than build up productive capacity (Suehiro, 1993). Suehiro further 
pointed out that in the case of Thailand, much of the diversification was carried out in 
order to take advantage of existing tax shelters as well. 
 
To summarize the argument so far, it is clear that family-based corporations have 
played a major role during the boom period of “East Asian Miracle”. What went right 
during this period at the firm level as documented by the studies cited above is the 
economically efficient use of the flexibility of family-based management. The owner-
managers, together with the professional managers they hired (e.g. the CP Group in 
Thailand, the Ayala Group in the Philippines, or Samsung and Lucky-Goldstar in Korea 
among others) met the challenges of late industrialization in many sectors by exploiting 
profit opportunities as they arose. These ventures were certainly helped by government 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 As pointed out by Yuri Sato during a discussion at ADBI, this problem became quite acute in the case of 
Indonesia before the crisis when the domestic banks borrowed from foreign banks and lent to their business   19
policies, including policies to build infrastructure. Finally, the family and kinship 
networks, especially among the Southeast Asian overseas Chinese, made “internal” (in 
the broad sense of the word) financing a source of expansion for a reasonable length of 
time initially. Self-monitoring may also have been effective during this period to a large 
extent. In addition, the family members in leading positions probably monitored the hired 
management closely as well. 
  Part of what went wrong – at the micro level – certainly came with the expansion 
of the family enterprises beyond the point where they could be financed primarily from 
the internal resources of the family groups. This resulted in highly leveraged debt-
financing. At the same time the control of the firm – through means discussed earlier – 
was not shared with outside shareholders. As a result, neither BLS nor EMS type of 
governance could be exercised efficiently.  
  An important area of on-going and future research will examine the broad 
hypotheses advanced in the previous paragraphs in the context of late industrialization at 
the level of family-based corporate systems. It is possible, in principle, through further 
empirical work to ascertain whether FBS should be completely replaced with BLS or 
EMS (or some combination of both – a hybrid form of governance perhaps) or FBS can 
still be a viable form for some East Asian economies, particularly the ones at a lower 
stage of development (perhaps with GDP/capita of US $ 3000 or below). Even if this 
hypothesis can be demonstrated to be true for the low or middle income economies in the 
aggregate, there is still the further question of whether diversification has reached beyond 
the economies of scope allowed by the level of development of the economy. If this is 
true, then diversification is now a drag on scarce managerial and financial resources of 
the corporations. In addition, the monitoring problems may also have become 
increasingly more severe leading to a failure of FBS. These significant issues require 
further empirical research using and building upon the conceptual framework presented in 
this paper. Given the limited scope of the present paper only some rudimentary analysis 
can be carried out here. Accordingly, in the rest of the paper I examine briefly the relation 
between transaction costs and the family-based system of governance by interpreting the 
existing evidence on the legal environment and diversification in the relevant Asian 
economies. Even this very preliminary investigation reveals some surprising features with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
groups without being monitored by anyone.   20
regards to the relation between different stages of development, legal systems and FBS. 
Furthermore, the relationship between FBS and diversification also turns out not to be as 
simple as is usually assumed in the literature. In particular, diversification seems to be 
more closely related to the internal management structure and the expertise of the firm, on 
the one hand, and the external industrial organization on the other, than to some formal 
structure of corporate governance per se. These issues are discussed in greater detail in 
the next section.        21
IV.  FBS at Different Stages of Development: Legal Systems, Transactions Costs 
and Diversification 
 
  One way to make the hypothetical relationship between level of economic 
development of a particular country and the form of corporate governance for a family-
based business more concrete is to think in terms of transactions costs. In particular, 
underdevelopment may be associated with not only incomplete markets but also 
imperfect legal systems where property rights are not well-defined nor the court system 
well-developed. Enforcement of such laws as may exist may also be haphazard. This 
latter phenomenon is related to weakness of governance in a broader sense. Given this 
type of weakness - legal and institutional - firms may be able to minimize transactions 
costs by using a flexible, relationship-oriented form of organization. Historically and 
culturally, in East Asia this form has generally been identified with the family businesses. 
Therefore, it is possible that FBS may be the paradigmatic form of corporate governance 
for the Asian countries at various stages of development. Naturally, this implies that 
Asian economies at different stages of development will have to address different 
problems with respect to their systems of family-based corporate governance. 
  In order to clarify whether this is indeed the case it is instructive to look at some 
common measures of how the legal systems perform in various Asian countries. Table 4.1 
below gives some quantitative measures used specifically to assess the quality of legal 
environments (La Porta et. al. 1998). Using exactly the same measures as La Porta et. al. 
have introduced in the literature through their pioneering study of law and (corporate) 
finance, but applying them in the specific context of Asian economies at different stages 
of development we can draw a number of interesting conclusions. 
  Table 4.1 measures the quality of the legal environments that firms face in 
selected Asian countries. The relevant information is summarized in this table for the 
Asian economies that are of particular interest to us. Five measures of the quality of legal 
environment are used in table 4.1 below, namely efficiency of the judicial system, rule of 
law, corruption, risk of expropriation by the government, and probability of contract 
repudiation by the government. In addition, an assessment of the quality of a country's 
accounting standards is presented since accounting can play a crucial role in corporate 
governance.   22
 




















Hong  Kong  10.00  8.22 8.52 8.29 8.82  69 24,290  25,280 
Malaysia 9.00  6.78 7.38 7.95 7.43  76 4,370  4,680 
Singapore  10.00  8.57 8.22 9.30 8.86  78 30,550  32,940 
Thailand 3.25  6.25 5.18 7.42 7.57  64 2,960  2,800 
Indonesia  2.50  3.98 2.15 7.16 6.09  na 1,080  1,110 
Philippines  4.75  2.73 2.92 5.22 4.80  65 1,160  1,220 
South  Korea  6.00  5.35 5.30 8.31 8.59  62 10,610  10,550 
Taipei,China  6.75  8.52 6.85 9.12 9.16  65 13,310  14069 
 
 
Definition of variables 
 
Variable Description  Sources 
Efficiency of 
judicial system 
Assessment of the "efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, 
particularly foreign firms" produced by the country-risk rating agency Business International 
Corporation. It "may be taken to represent investors' assessments of conditions in the country in 





Rule of law  Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the risk-rating agency 
International Country Risk (ICR). Average of the months of April and October of the monthly 
index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for law 




Corruption  ICR's assessment of the corruption in government. Lower scores indicate "high government 
officials are likely to demand special payments" and "illegal payments are generally expected 
throughout lower levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export 
licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans". Average of the months 
of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with 
lower scores for higher levels of corruption. (Scale has been changed from its original range 






ICR's assessment of the risk of "outright confiscation" or "forced nationalization". Average of the 
months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, 







ICR's assessment of the "risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of a repudiation, 
postponement, or scaling down" due to "budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in 
government, or a change in government economic and social priorities". Average of the months 
of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with 






Index created by examining and rating companies' 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or 
omission of 90 items. These items fall into 7 categories (general information, income statements, 
balance sheets, fund flow statement, accounting standard, stock data and special items). A 
minimum of 3 companies in each country were studied. The companies represent a cross-section 
of various industry groups where industrial companies numbered 70 percent while financial 









GNP and GNP 
per capita 
Gross National Product and Gross National Product per capita in constant dollars of 1996 and 
1997. 
World Bank  
    
  Source: Modified from La Porta et al. (1998) pp. 1122-26 and1142-43 
 
Enforcement variables              Accounting           GNP  per capita    
      ( U S $ )                      23
Scrutinizing table 4.1 it can be seen that in general, countries with low GDP/capita 
such as Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines have relatively underdeveloped legal systems 
and uneven enforcement of laws. This would seem to imply that ceteris paribus firms in 
these economies face high transactions costs. NIEs such as Hong Kong and Singapore 
show scores on all the relevant variables that indicate a more developed legal structure 
and its enforcement. Among the NIEs South Korea and Taipei,China both rank lower in 
these respects than Singapore and Hong Kong. Surprisingly, Malaysia which is closer to 
the lower income countries in terms of GDP/capita actually has higher standing in terms 
of the efficiency of the judicial system than South Korea or Taipei,China. 
Another interesting finding from table 4.1 is that the transparency and efficiency 
of accounting standards do not show much variation from one economy to another. For 
example, Thailand, with a score of 64, is in the same category as Taipei,China which 
receives a score of 65. Even Hong Kong has a score of 69, only slightly ahead of 
Thailand. One popular explanation of the failure of corporate governance in East Asia 
attributes it to the lack of transparency in accounting standards among other factors. The 
available evidence, however, raises doubts about the validity of this assertion. How is it 
possible that economies like Hong Kong and Taipei,China can have FBS type of 
governance that are seemingly successful, given that their accounting systems are not any 
more transparent than that of Thailand?         
  The data presented in table 4.1 with respect to specific factors such as the rule of 
law and efficiency of the judicial system are also consistent with the hypothesis that at a 
lower stage of development the legal systems are not so efficient, and other things being 
equal, present higher transactions costs. While more developed economies such as Hong 
Kong and Singapore score 10 out of 10 in terms of efficiency, less developed countries 
like Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand score much lower (2.5, 4.75 and 3.25 
respectively). Therefore, it seems plausible that FBS can economize on transactions costs 
– given the inefficient legal systems – in these lower income countries. 
  What is really surprising is that some economies with efficient legal systems such 
as Hong Kong also have family-based system of corporate governance.
11 How can FBS 
function successfully in these economies? Are there features of FBS that remain relevant   24
even at higher levels of income in Asia? It could be conjectured that there are specific 
factors in each case that can explain the continuing relevance of FBS. For example, in 
Hong Kong the government and banks hold a negligible portion of the shares of the 
companies, making family control inevitable. However, competition in a more or less 
laissez faire environment where corporate and other laws are interpreted clearly and 
enforced reasonably well might explain why FBS is still a workable form of corporate 
governance in Hong Kong. Another interesting case is Singapore which has some large 
family-controlled firms and business groups, but a system of corporate governance that is 
influenced by the government through the government-linked corporations. In case of 
Singapore, the close guidance from government in a competitive environment might 
explain the relatively better performance of the family businesses there. These are, of 
course, conjectures that would require more careful formulation and further verification.  
  Finally, both S. Korea and Taipei,China have similar levels of development and 
family-based systems of corporate governance. Yet, S. Korean chaebols are undergoing 
restructuring after the crisis while Taipei,China’s system continues to work relatively well. 
We need to ask what can explain the different performances of FBS in these two cases. 
  The upshot of the whole discussion is that concrete case studies of corporate 
governance of these economies must be done in order to assess the workability of the 
FBS in each particular case. Among other things, this should also help focus attention on 
the feasible policies for making the transition from FBS, if necessary, in economies such 
as South Korea. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 Singapore also has some large family-controlled businesses. However, on the whole, the government-
linked corporations, the relatively well-functioning banking system and the presence of multinationals are 
the major factors in corporate governance. See also Linda Lim (1983)   25
Development of Family Businesses, Transactions Costs and Diversification: 
 
 A  significant factor that may at least partly explain the differential performances 
of FBS in different Asian economies is the extent of corporate diversification. What is the 
relationship between the family-owned firms and diversification in Asian economies? 
How should we test the various formulations of what may be called the diversification 
hypothesis? 
One way to formulate the diversification hypothesis that addresses directly the 
concerns of this paper  is to look at  the relationship between diversification and family-
owned firms.
12 At a low level of development, diversification may be a way to lower 
transaction costs by diversifying in order to create internal factor markets. We can call 
this the 'internal market hypothesis' (Claessens, et al., 1999).
13 Here, internal factor 




  Existing empirical work on the reasons for diversification of family-owned firms 
leads to the conclusion that at low level of development diversification increases 
profitability. However, as legal systems become more transparent and efficient with 
increasing GDP/capita there is actually a ‘diversification discount’. In other words, 
further diversification actually leads to a loss of value.  
Claessens et al. (1998) present some interesting econometric evidence regarding 
the relationship between different stages of development in Asian economies and 
corporate diversification. They find a positive effect of diversification on corporate 
performance at an earlier stage of development.  They also try to estimate the influence of 
family group membership on diversification. One of their main findings is that family 
group membership can be linked to excessive diversification. They also find 
diversification at an earlier stage of development adding value to the firm while at a later 
                                                            
12 Testing such hypothesis would require micro, firm-level data. There are several databases of this type, 
including the World Scope Database including more than 2500 observations for East Asian firms. 
13 Of course, there are alternative hypotheses as well. Two of these are the reduction of firm-specific risk 
and expropriation of wealth from minority shareholders. 
14 This usage of 'market within the firm' is not literally true, of course, unless a market simulation via 
shadow pricing is attempted.  I have conformed here with the standard literature (see, for example, 
Williamson, 1985; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Claessens et al., 1999) rather than coin another, less 
metaphorical term.   26
stage there is a negative impact of diversification on the value creation. Their overall 
estimate of this so-called ‘diversification discount’ is about 5 percent on the average. 
 
Here again looking at seemingly successful FBS governance in Hong Kong, and 
Taipei, China raises the question of whether diversification discounts really exist for these 
economies as well.  Since the study cited uses cross section data from a limited sample 
this question can not be answered without further careful econometric work.  Single 
country studies using time-series data are needed to determine if and to what extent 
diversification discount exists in each case.  
 
However, it can be conjectured prima facie that the diversification discount, if it 
exists at all in the above cases, must be much smaller than that in the crisis economies.  A 
hypothesis that can explain the seemingly better performance of firms in these economies 
through concentration in general, in their core competencies would emphasize the greater 
professional expertise and internal efficiencies of these firms together with the industrial 
organization aspects, particularly the existence of greater market competition.  For the 
present let us call it the influence of industrial organization or IIO hypothesis, keeping 
in mind that factors internal to the firm such as managerial and professional 
expertise are also included.  According to the IIO hypothesis diversification is less a 
function of corporate governance per se than these other strategic efficiency-driving 
factors. Without competent management with strategic vision and market competition 
corporate governance by itself may not be of much influence. Of course, to the extent that 
good corporate governance creates incentives to develop a competent, professional 
management structure it will be of particular relevance as well. In addition to the 
commonly expressed concerns with corporate governance IIO should usefully focus the 
attention of policy makers on the nature and extent of managerial expertise and incentive 
structures within the firm.  It should also direct the policy makers’ attention to the extent 
of competition in the markets in which the family-businesses participate. Therefore, it 
will be important to test a suitable formulation of this hypothesis for various Asian 
economies at different stages of development on a case by case basis. One particular form 
that can be called the (governance) parity hypothesis would attribute equal importance to 
both corporate governance and to factors included under the rubric of industrial   27
organization above. Specifying the parity hypothesis as a null hypothesis and testing this 
against various alternatives statistically could throw more light on the relative importance 
of corporate governance in determining corporate performance in Asia. 
 
V. A Mathematical Model of Corporate Governance and Financing of an 
Entrepreneurial Firm: The Limits of Principal- Agent Model  
In this section, I discuss a model of corporate finance and show the limits of the principal-
agent framework in the Asian context. The model is presented in several steps as follows: 
 
1.  In a private ownership economy consider the owner's choices regarding investing in 
projects. At the initial period (called period 0) a fixed amount I  has to be invested. 
Let edenote the personal effort expended for the project. Let Unit cost of e be equal 
to 1. Consider 2 more periods and the dynamic choices as follows with two possible 
states of nature, Good and Bad, denoted as G and B respectively. 
 
Period 0     Period  1    Period  2 
Investment I  made    State realized      Payoff in good 
state X =  
Effort e after the investment  In good state the project  Payoff in bad 
state X =  
     can  continue.  In  bad  state  with  probability 
B P and  
the project is liquidated  zero with probability 




2.  Banks enter the market in each period to acquire information and make loans. By 
making loans, a bank gains access to the internal records of the firm. The bank 
monitors the firm's accounts. Information is 'soft' and can not be communicated to the   28
outsiders even if the firm wants to do so. Costs of monitoring are assumed to be 
negligible. 
 
3.  Equity market, or arms-length investors lend in period zero and collect payments in 
period 2. Even if they lend they do not examine the books either because the private 
cost of monitoring is high or because the size of loans is small. 
 
4.  Information Asymmetries: Everybody in period zero knows about the state of 
project at the time. However, once the project starts only the owner knows the effort 
e. The owner also learns about the state before deciding to continue with the project. 
The 'inside' bank is informed also. It learns about the effort provided and the state at 
the same time as the owner. 'Outside' banks and equity holders can only have public 
information. 
 
5.  Contracts: Following Diamond (1991) and Gale and Hellwig (1985), without loss of 
generality, it is sufficient to consider only pure discount debt contracts (see also Rajan 
(1992) which is followed closely here). The firm borrows an amount  t A at period t 
and is required to make one payment  i t D + for convenience and to add some realism 
contracts over only one period would be called a "short-term contracts". Longer than 
one period contracts are called "long-term contracts". Any debt contract can be 
written as a convex combination of both short-term and long-term contracts. 
 
In this model the borrower decides on what type of lender to select and the length of 
the debt contract. He must also decide on the level of effort e. After writing the 
contract in  period 1, the borrower must decide whether to continue or quit (and 
liquidate). 
  The lender in this model offers the contract at period zero under given terms and 
conditions. In period one the lender must decide whether to renegotiate, stop the 
supply of credit, keep the old contract, or offer a new contract in the next period. 
 
6.  Optimal Contracts   29
Expected surplus to the owner at period zero: 
e L I y e q I X y e q − − − − − ) ))( , ( 1 ( ) )( , ( 
where  = y common knowledge information about project quality in period zero and 
q(.) is the probability of the good state. This is a function that is increasing in both its 
arguments. 
 
It is clear that the project should be financed only if the surplus is positive for some 
effort level. The effort level which maximizes the surplus can be found by solving: 
For   e e =









1        …..(A1) 
 
The optimal contract must possess the following features: 
1)  The owner should receive the incentive to quit voluntarily in the bad state. The 
same purpose will be served if the lender has the ability and the incentive to 
coerce the owner to do the above. 
2)  The incentive structure and the environment should be such that the owner will 
get all the surplus in G and bear all the losses in B. 
It is a deep result of the contracts literature that no rational contract can  
simultaneously achieve objectives (1) and (2) above. 
 
6.1 Arm's-Length Contract 
An amount I is borrowed at period 0. It is promised to be repaid in period to as a sum 
02 D  
The owner chooses the optimal effort level by solving 
e
max   e D X P y e q D X y e q B − − − + − )) ( ))( , ( 1 ( ) )( , ( 02 02    …..(A2) 
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Let  
*
a e solve the corresponding FOC. 
The lender must conjecture that the (ex post) effort level will be (say) a e . He will lend, 
as long as  
B P y e q y e q
I
D
a a )] , ( ( 1 ( ) , ( [
02 − +
≥      …..(A3) 
 




a a e e =
         …..(A4) 
 
If the credit market is competitive (A3) holds with equality. If an optimal contract 
exists, it is defined implicitly by the following equation when 
*
a e e =  
   
) 1 ](
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=  …..(A5) 
 
However, 
* * e ea < . The reason is simple. The owner continues in the bad state. This forces 
the lender to demand a higher face value thus reducing the amount of surplus available to 
the owner in the good state. The inefficiency arises from the inability of the owner to 
commit to quit in the bad state. 
  Also for low values of y (reflecting the intrinsic poor quality of the project) the 
face value demanded could be too high. Generally, the returns to the lender could also 
decline with an increase in face value because this would reduce the incentive to provide 
effort (minimize  a e  in equation (A3)). Credit will then need to be rationed. 
 
6.2 Bank Contracts 
6.2.1 Short term Bank Contract  
Here in period one if the state is B the project can be liquidated. The bank recovers L. In 
state G the bank can use discretion and demand a share of the surplus in return for further 
lending. There is thus a bargaining game to be solved. In equilibrium the owner gets   31
) ( L X r − and the lender gets  L L X r + − − ) )( 1 ( where  1 0 ≤ ≤ r . Here, r denotes the 
share of the unallocated surplus going to the owner after bargaining. Although assumed to 
be exogenous here it can be made endogenous. However, at this stage this will only make 
the model more complicated without adding too many insights. We can think of r as the 
"bargaining power" of the owner. Let 
*
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SG e e =  and the condition for individual rationality holds we have, 
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This is the non-negative profit condition for the bank. With a value of r close to 1 the 
bank may not be able to cover the depreciation losses. On the other hand, if the value of r 
is low (i.e. close to 0) then the owner, facing poor incentives, will not exert much effort. 
In either of these two extreme sets of cases the rational bank will not lend. For 
intermediate values, the bank may lend; but there will be suboptimal effort. 
  It is to be noted, however, that by constraining bargaining sufficiently by means of 
an external nonrenegotiable mechanism the incentives for providing optimal effort can be 
restored. One possibility is for the bank to commit lending at a particular interest rate. At 
the same time the bank should have the option to pull out whenever the effort observed is 
lower than optimal. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) and Hart and Moore (1988) 
discuss various constraining options of this type. 
 
6.2.2 Long-term Bank Contract 
In this case in period 1 the loan can be renewed automatically and in period 2 the required 
repayment is  2 D . Let us see what may happen in between. In period 1 if the state is B it is 
best to abandon the project. However, the bank can not do this when the contract is long-
term. During renegotiation the surplus from closing down is  ) ( X P L B − . 
The owner will get   ) ( ) ( 2 X P L r D X P B B − + −    32
The bank will get   ) )( 1 ( 2 X P L r D P B B − − +  
The first term in each expression is the amount specified in the initial contract. 
The feasibility condition here is: 
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The R.S. gives the face value demanded by the bank so that it can break even. The 
inequality says that the project return should be enough to meet this requirement in the 
good state. 
 
It is now time to ask how far this type of models can take us in evaluating governance. 
Clearly, monitoring aspects come out as crucial, and this is a major insight of this 
approach in understanding the agency problem of capitalist organizations and finance. 
Yet, there are several aspects in the Asian context that are overlooked by this approach. In 
particular one can make the following three observations: 
 
 
(1) In the Asian context the owner may not have much of a chance to choose between 
contracts. 
(2) International environment may give firms incentives to borrow short-term. 
(3) Most importantly, in order for this stylized framework to be relevant, an enabling 
environment of supporting network of institutions and administrative apparatus for 
enforcing contracts must exist.  
 
It should also be emphasized that a “realist” view of the corporation would recognize the 
contextual nature of the problems of Asian corporate governance. At the same time, it 
would highlight, as I have done here, historically and logically, the problem of fiduciary 
responsibilities of the corporate form of capitalist organization. Clearly, such 
responsibilities can and should be discussed in a larger domestic and international socio-
economic context that includes the evolution of legal institutions and international 
economic relations  as well.Both the positive and normative aspects are equally important.   33
That is why after raising many specific questions regarding corporate governance in the 
Asian countries affected by the financial crisis, I raise two overall questions: 
1.  Ultimately, given the current political and economic situation and the existing 
institutional structures in the affected countries, what system of corporate governance 
will be the most efficient? Will the firm become a stakeholder firm (with managers, 
employees, shareholders all playing a role) or an Anglo-American type firm? Or will 
some kind of hybrid governance structure be the best? 
 
2.  Once we determine the answer to the above question, what specific policy measures 
will strategically be the most significant in helping the financial system navigate its 
way towards the normatively optimal system from an overall social point of view? 
 
These questions are relevant for any economy with a corporate form of economic 
organization. It is simply begging the question to assume that the EMS type is already or 
always the best institutional design.   34
VI.  Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
In this paper I have tried to analyze some basic conceptual and theoretical issues 
related to corporate governance. Concretly, this was done by studying the historical 
development of corporate governance systems in East Asia, and their vulnerability to 
financial crisis. The three-fold division of corporate governance systems presented in this 
paper seems appropriate from the perspective of a realist approach to the nature of the 
corporation and its governance. On this view, the “historic mission” of the corporation as 
site of capital accumulation may require different types of governance structures under 
different historical conditions. In particular, in the East Asian context, the FBS structure 
has played an important role in the initial phase of capital accumulation in the East Asian 
countries. Indeed, its prevalence in Asian economies at all levels of development makes 
FBS almost a paradigmatic feature of corporate organization and governance in Asia. 
Complex questions, however, arise with regards to how appropriate this system is 
currently in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. At present, one proposal is that it should 
be replaced by BLS. For instance, the new bank-based governance could be modeled after 
either the Japanese or the German type of corporate governance. For this to happen, 
however, bank restructuring and recapitalization and an improvement of prudential 
regulation, accountability and transparency will be essential. A competing proposal is that 
the transition should be towards an EMS type of corporate governance. It should be 
recognized that the problems here are even more formidable. The thinness of both bond 
and equity markets is one problem. In addition, there are the usual problems of lack of 
adequate regulatory structures, transparency and accountability. The proposal for self-
monitoring by Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) is an example of how difficult it is to 
have an EMS type of governance in Southeast Asia. In particular, the limited expertise 
and other institutional resources make the implementation of such proposals (which really 
should be self-enforcing) problematic. Still, future empirical work should focus on the 
appropriateness of each one of these structures using whatever systematic quantitative 
and institutional information is available. 
  Another important aspect of family business in East Asia is their ability to adapt 
and reform. As Suehiro (1993, 1997) has pointed out, one rationale for the FBS-system is 
their flexibility in terms of managerial decision making process and their efficiency in   35
capital accumulation in the context of latecomer industrialization. The question that arises 
in the context of the crisis in East Asia is whether for the Southeast Asian economies in 
particular, the process of catch-up growth is still continuing. If that is the case, the 
transition process from FBS to either BLS or EMS may need to be slower. In Northeast 
Asia, however, as some researchers have shown (Khan 1997, 1998, forthcoming) the 
period of catch up growth has largely ended and global competitiveness must be 
increasingly based on organizational and product and technical innovations. Here the 
transition from FBS may need to be effected more speedily. However, as emphasized 
earlier, much more empirical research using detailed micro data sets with country, sector 
and firm specific information is necessary before reaching any definitive conclusions. In 
this context, the suggestion that the firms’ managerial expertise as well as the industrial 
organization  can be just as important as the form of corporate governance in determining 
their performance should also be taken seriously. 
An important area of investigation for such future research should be Asian 
economies with strong family-based corporate groups that weathered the crisis relatively 
well. Economies such as Hong Kong seem to have a large presence of family-based 
corporations and yet have managed to maintain their economic vigor. What explains the 
seemingly better performance of FBS in these economies? This is the subject of ongoing 
research. Following a methodology that combines fieldwork, statistical analysis of 
existing data bases and an examination of the legal and institutional environment will lead 
to a better understanding of corporate governance and performance. Contrasting findings 
of this type of research with the findings about corporate governance in the crisis 
economies is a necessary condition for discovering the right road to reforming corporate 
governance in Asia. It is also clear that there is no single royal road to reform. Rather, a 
case by case approach that takes the institutional histories and their path dependence in 
each economy seriously is necessary.  
In a critical approach to reform, an intriguing question is how relevant from a 
perspective of long-run growth will corporate governance be in the future. Such a 
question is motivated by the need to distinguish between 'normal', growth-inducing 
macro-institutional environment and periods of crisis. It may be that during normal 
periods of growth when many institutions and policies are creating opportunities for 
growth, a few badly managed firms would not matter. An extreme form of this hypothesis,   36
of course, is that even with systemic bad corporate governance, under favorable aggregate 
macro economic and other institutional conditions growth is not hindered. A counter-
hypothesis is that prior to the crisis some economies such as Korea had a reasonably well-
functioning corporate governance system; but matters changed some time prior to the 
crisis. From this perspective, in the particular case of South Korea it may be hypothesized 
that the early 90s were such a watershed period when the external environment of chaebol 
regulations changed, making bad governance inevitable. If this is true then just internal 
reforms of governance may not be sufficient to induce the corporations to produce 
efficiently. On the other hand, the first hypothesis does not see such reforms as being 
even a necessary condition for future Asian growth. Clearly, given the different 
implications of these various hypotheses it is important to test them fully before 
recommending appropriate policies for corporate governance reform in East Asia. 
Finally, the analysis presented in this paper shows both the scope and the limits of 
the principal-agent approach to corporate governance. Given multiple stakeholders and 
longer time horizons for at least some of these principals, the agency problem needs to be 
recast in terms of more explicit social goals. Such an approach does not start from the 
atomistic agents, but rather from the concept of the firm as a socially embedded 
hierarchical system. Bounded rationality, uncertainty and transactions costs can then be 
modeled quite naturally. For normative analysis, such a theoretical approach can also use 
a nonutilitarian approach to welfare such as Sen’s capability approach.
15 In this context, 
the issue of the fiduciary responsibility of the corporation assumes the utmost importance. 
The recent ENRON and other scandals in the US show that this is an issue of positive and 
normative salience not just in post-crisis Asia but in every economic system with 
corporate form of organizational structure. 
                                                            
15 See for example, A. Sen, Development as Freedom., and H. A. Khan, Technology, Development and 
Democracy for a  discussion of this alternative normative approach.   37
Appendix (1) 
 
Family-based Businesses in Thailand 
 
Table A 1.1: Characteristics of Top Shareholders in Large Thai Corporations, 




1979     %  1988     % 
(1) Individual: 
   1-9% 
   10-29% 
   30-50% 
   51-100% 
   Foreigner 
                   72     (33.0) 
                     3 
                   35 
                   29 
                     1 
                     4 
                     74     (29.7) 
                       4 
                     43 
                     23 
                       4 
                       0 
(2)  Family investment company: 
           1-9% 
           10-50% 
           51-100% 
26 (11.9) 
  3 
17 






(3) Thai  corporation: 
           1-9% 
           10-29% 
           30-50% 
           51-100% 
37 (17.0) 
  3 
15 
10 
  9 
67 (26.9) 




(4) Foreign  corporation: 
           10-48% 
           49-50% 
           51-98% 











(5)   Government bureau                         3     (1.4)                         8     (3.2) 
(6)   Crown Property Bureau                         2     (09)                         3     (1.2) 
           Total                     218     (100.0)                     249     (100.0) 
 
Sources: Calculated by Suehiro (1993, p. 388) using the following directories: for 1979, Pan Siam 
Communication Co., Million Baht Business Information Thailand, 1980-81 (Bangkok, 1981); for 1988, 
International Business Research Thailand Co., Million Baht Business Information Thailand, 1989 (Bangkok, 
1989). 
Notes:   1. Large corporations indicate firms with 0.3 billion baht (1979) and 1 billion baht (1988) in 
  terms of total annual sales. 
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Table A 1.2: Top Three Stockholders in Thai Large Corporations, 
1979 and 1988 
 
Top Three Stockholders  1979     %  1988     % 
(1) Individuals  (Thai): 
           Belonging to the same family 








(2)  Individuals plus corporations: 
           With group companies
a 







(3) Thai  corporations: 
           Belonging to the same group 
           Among different groups 
           Holding-company type
b 
22 (10.1) 
  4 
15 





(4) Foreign  corporations: 
           Exclusively foreigners
c 
           With Thai corporations 








  8 
(5)  Government bureaus                          8     (3.7)                        11     (4.4) 
           Total                      258     (100.0)                      249     (100.0) 
 
Source: Calculated by Suehiro (1993, p.389) same as Table A 1.1. 
                                                            
a Group companies are members of the group of companies that the stockholders in question own and 
operate 
b Siam Cement Co., Ltd. and Suramahakhun Co., Ltd. 
c Includes a single firm with 100 per cent stockholdings.   39
 
Table A 1.3: Family Stockholders and Management Control 
in Thai Large Corporations, 1988 
 
 
      E q u i t y   P e r c e n t a g e   o f  
Top Management         Largest Stockholder          Total   % 
                    
                    1-9%         10-49%     50-100% 
Presidents / general managers: 
(1)  Same family with the  
largest stockholder 
















       33 
 
         8 
       22 
       11 
 
 
      55 
 
        1 
      11 
        1 
 
 
      91 
 
      11 
      37 
      14 
 
 
    59.5 
 
      7.2 
    24.2 
      9.2 
                Sub-total        11         74        68      153    100.0 
   (5)   No data available  ---           3          2          5   
Chairmen of board: 
(1)  Same family with the  
largest stockholder 















       21 
 
         4 
       13 
         2 
 
 
      34 
 
      --- 
        5 
      --- 
 
 
      56 
 
        5 
      25 
        3 
 
 
    62.9 
 
      5.6 
     28.1 
      3.4 
                Sub-total       10         55        39        89    100.0 
   (5)   No data available  ---         39        31        71   
Presidents (P) / chairmen (C): 
(1)  Both of P/C belonging to 
the same family with top 
three stockholders 
(2)  Either of P/C belonging 
to the same family with  
top three stockholders 












       14 
 
 
       19 




      29 
 
 
        8 




      45 
 
 
      29 




    50.0 
 
 
    32.2 
    17.8 
                Sub-total  10         57        39        90    100.0 
   (4)   No data available  1         38        31        70   
 
Sources: Survey by A. Suehiro (1993); same as table A.1.1 
Notes:   1. Figures cover large corporations with annual sales of 1 billion baht in 1988 
2. Foreigner 100 per cent controlled and government partially owned companies have been        
excluded 
3. Subsidiaries of Siam Cement group and Suramahakhun group have been excluded 
                                                            
a Figures include non-identified presidents or chairmen   40
Appendix (2) 
 
Enhancement of Control in the Family-based (FBS) type of Corporate Governance 
 
Figure A.2.1: The Lotte Group 




Source: Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan and Larry H.P. Lang  (1999, p.12) 
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Abolition of Regulations Protecting the Chaebols 
 
 
Table A.3.1: Abolition of Regulations Protecting the Chaebols 
 
External Shocks Expected Changes 1998 1999 2000
Cross- Likely to be phased out to    1998 Limited to 25% of net
shareholdings increase transparency worth for top 30 chaebols
Protection M&A market deregulation    February 1998 Tender offer
from M&A “IMF crisis” likely to result in hostile obligation abolished
threats takeovers     May 1998 Ceiling on
foreign ownership abolished
Lack of Enhanced shareholder    1998 Cumulative    1999 Shareholder
minority rights and monitoring board voting   derivative lawsuits
shareholder  system will provide expected   likely to be legalized
rights disciplinary mechanisms
Deregulation
Ability to  Securing capital will become     1998 No new                      2000
grow via more difficult for chaebol cross-guarantees         Cross-guarantees
financial  Debt-to-equity ratio needs         to be phased out
leveraging to conform to international
standards
Financial
Strong and political Dissolution of group     1998 At least one    1999 At least 25% of 
coordination pressure chairman’s office may outside board            board to be outsiders
via chairman’s lead to vacuum of  member
office control and coordination     1998 Group chairman’s office 
dissolved; each legal entity required 
to form its own board
Source: Yuji Akaba, Florain Budde and Jungkiu Choi, "Restructuring South Korea's Chaebol", 




Performance of East Asian Corporate Systems: Growth, Financing and Liabilities 
 
In order to answer the question: what is the appropriate corporate governance system for 
East Asia after the crisis, we need to understand the performance of the corporates before 
the crisis. Generally, it appears that the high debt and leverage ratios were source of 
potential problems. They became sources of actual problems with the capital account 
liberalization without adequate attention to the problems of short-term debt structures of 
the corporation. 
One hypothesis about the recent financial crisis, as alluded to already, has been 
that it was caused  - at least in part - by the weak performance and riskiness of corporate 
ventures. Before one can test the hypothesis in a rigorous way it is necessary to look at 
some basic indicators. In this appendix I will look at six salient indicators. These are: 
 
1.  Real return on assets (RoA) 
2. Sales 
3.  Investment and capital 
4. Leverage 
5. Long-term  debt 
6. Interest  coverage 
 
Nominal Rate of return on assets is measured as the ratio of EBIT (earnings before 
interest and taxes) at the firm level and total assets. Real rate of returns is the nominal 






RoA        …..(1) 
 
                                                            
16 There are, of course, other measures of RoA, for example operational margin. This measure shows less 
cross-country differences. But again, Singapore and Korea turn out to be relatively lower margin producers. 
On this, see Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1998)   43
 
where   = RoA  real rate of return on assets at the firm level 
   = TA   total assets at the firm level 
= π   annual inflation rate 
 
 
Table 1 below shows the median RoA in percentage terms for eight Asian economies. It 
displays quite a bit of variation across these countries. For example, in Hong Kong, Korea 
and Singapore the RoA is, on the average between 4 and 5 percent. These rates are quite 
low compared with those of Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia. For these countries 
RoAs vary between 8 and 10 percent per year. Malaysia and Taipei,China occupy an 
intermediate position. These rates are measured after expressing all terms in the identity 
(1) in local currencies. Measuring them in foreign currencies (for example dollars) would 
simply show an upward adjustment for real exchange rate appreciation. 
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Table A.4.1: Return on Assets for Eight Asian Countries(assets measured by book value) 
(%, medians, in real local currency) 
Country  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 '88-'96 
Hong  Kong  5.1 5.3 4.9 4.8 4.5 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.6 
Indonesia  n.a n.a 9.4 9.1 8.6 7.9 7.4 6.2 6.5 7.1 
Korea  4.4 3.9 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.1 3.7 
Malaysia 5.4 5.6 5.4 6.2 6.0 6.5 6.3 6.1 5.6 6.3 
Philippines  n.a n.a n.a 7.1 6.4 8.1 8.5 6.8 8.4 7.9 
Singapore  4.9 4.5 4.2 3.9 5.2 4.6 4.5 3.9 4.0 4.4 
Taiwan  n.a n.a n.a 5.1 6.2 6.5 6.8 6.5 6.6 6.7 
Thailand  10.8 11.0 11.7 11.2 10.2 9.8  9.3  7.8  7.4  9.8 
 
Source: Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1998) 
 
Table 2 below gives the sales growth on a year-on-year basis for these eight countries. 
They also show quite a bit of variation over time. On the average most of the corporations 
registered high sales growth.  The MIT (Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand) economies 
show very high average rate of growth, respectively; Taipei,China and Hong Kong are 
close behind with a 9.3 and 9.2 percent growth on the average respectively. In 1996, 
however, Thailand, Indonesia, Taipei, China and Singapore showed a slower rate of 
growth. The export slowdown in 1996 is at least partly responsible for this. 
 
 
Table A.4.2: Real Sales Growth (Year-on-Year) for Eight Asian Countries 
(%, medians) 
Country  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 '88-'96 
Hong  Kong  10.1 11.6 10.2 12.4 9.8  9.4  9.7  11.8 9.2 
Indonesia n.a  n.a  n.a  10.7 12.1 12.4 9.4  8.3  10.6 
Korea  8.4 8.7 8.2 8.3 7.6 7.3 7.2 8.6 8.2 
Malaysia  9.7  12.3 11.8 12.7 13.1 12.6 11.7 11.9 11.9 
Philippines  n.a n.a n.a 8.4 6.7 7.6 10.6  12.2  8.2 
Singapore  8.4 8.6 8.1 9.4 11.6  11.8  10.2  7.7 8.7 
Taiwan  n.a n.a n.a 7.1 11.3  10.3  9.7 8.4 9.3 
Thailand  11.6 10.3 10.8 9.6  8.3  10.1 10.7 5.7  9.7 
 
Source: Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1998) 
 
Closely correlated with the high sales growth rate is the high volume of capital 
accumulation resulting from high rates of investment. Table 3 demonstrates this 
proposition. Investment growth is measured as the ratio of new investments to existing 
fixed assets from 1988 – 1996. Indonesia, Korea and Thailand maintained remarkably   45
high rates of investment. Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore also registered investment 
growth rates of over 10 percent. In retrospect, questions have been raised not about the 









Country  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 '88-'96 
Hong  Kong  14.3  16.6  8.3 7.6 7.2 19.8  7.6 5.8 9.3 8.3 
Indonesia n.a  n.a  n.a  12.4 13.4 8.6  15.8 13.8 11.8 12.7 
Korea  15.6 13.8 13.2 19.2 11.6 11.2 12.2 12.4 13.7 13.6 
Malaysia  8.6  7.6  8.9  9.6  11.3 13.4 15.2 14.6 16.1 10.7 
Philippines  n.a n.a n.a 9.1 8.9 7.8 13.5  14.1  14.5  10.8 
Singapore  7.8 7.6 7.4 8.8 9.6 11.3  13.4  12.5  13.5  10.4 
Taiwan  n.a n.a n.a 14.3  8.2 8.4 8.7 11.2  8.6 8.7 
Thailand  10.4 12.9 12.3 15.0 14.9 15.0 14.7 14.5 5.8  13.8 
 
Source: Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1998) 
 
 
In retrospect the data also show the degree of riskiness inherent in the liabilities incurred 
by the corporations, especially in the crisis countries with relatively low RoAs. Some of 
these countries (e.g. Korea) turned abroad for financing. Surprisingly even countries with 
high RoA such as Indonesia and Thailand also borrowed heavily abroad. Domestic Bank 
lending which has also become a characteristic of the East Asian Miracle has naturally 
been high also.  Table 4 gives the leverage ratio (i.e. debt over equity) for the eight 
countries. Interestingly, the ratios are not the same in all countries. Korea’s average of 
about 3.5 is about 4.5 times as high as that of 0.82 for Taipei,China. Indonesia, Thailand 
and Hong Kong also show high leverage.  However, the case of Hong Kong shows that 
high leverage may not necessarily result in systemic financial crisis, although the 
aftermath of crisis in Asia has certainly weakened its economy. 
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Table A.4.4: Leverage (Debt/Equity) for Eight Asian Countries 
(%, means) 
Country  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 '88-'96 
Hong  Kong 1.832 2.311 1.783 2.047 1.835 1.758 2.273 1.980 1.559 1.902 
Indonesia  n.a  n.a  n.a  1.943 2.097 2.054 1.661 2.115 1.878 1.951 
Korea  2.820 2.644 3.105 3.221 3.373 3.636 3.530 3.776 3.545 3.467 
Malaysia  0.727 0.810 1.010 0.610 0.627 0.704 0.991 1.103 1.176 0.908 
Philippines n.a  n.a  n.a  0.830 1.186 1.175 1.148 1.150 1.285 1.129 
Singapore  0.765 0.922 0.939 0.887 0.856 1.102 0.862 1.037 1.049 0.936 
Taiwan  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.679 0.883 0.866 0.894 0.796 0.802 0.820 
Thailand  1.602 1.905 2.159 2.010 1.837 1.914 2.126 2.224 2.361 2.008 
 
Source: Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1998) 
 
 
It is also noteworthy that long-term debt has been low during the period under 
consideration. This is illustrated in Table 5 below. With the exception of Philippines, the 
share is less than 50 percent for all other countries; Malaysia, Thailand and Taipei,China 
have the lowest share (between 29.2, 30.9 and 35.9 percent respectively). In most cases 




Table A.4.5: Long Term Debt Share for Eight Asian Countries 
(%, medians) 
 
Country  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 '88-'96 
Hong  Kong  59.7 59.5 53.8 56.5 44.7 44.7 40.7 37.3 36.4 44.9 
Indonesia n.a  n.a  n.a  52.4 40.8 39.6 41.6 41.8 43.3 43.1 
Korea  55.7 47.2 49.8 49.8 44.2 43.7 41.4 40.4 41.5 43.7 
Malaysia  35.8 35.5 32.5 27.1 26.9 26.6 27.2 27.8 29.9 29.2 
Philippines  n.a  n.a  n.a  57.2 53.1 50.3 50.2 49.8 51.4 52.2 
Singapore 57.2 55.4 54.1 33.8 33.8 33.9 40.2 38.6 41.1 43.3 
Taiwan  n.a  n.a  n.a  53.9 44.4 32.8 34.6 34.3 38.9 35.9 
Thailand  58.1 49.8 38.8 34.3 25.2 26.4 27.6 32.9 32.8 30.9 
 
Source: Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1998) 
 
 
Debt, even short-term debt, by itself does not imply that anything is seriously wrong as 
long as the ability to pay is not questioned by the creditors. It is useful to look at measures 
such as interest payment coverage (IPC) to see if there were indications of problems in 
this regard in the corporate sectors of some of the Asian economies. Interest payment 
coverage is defined as follows: 
   47
penses InterestEx
EBITDA
IPC =       …..(2) 
 
where EBITDA = earnings before interest and taxes but adding back depreciation 
 
IPC is a measure of how adequate operational cash flows (given by the size of EBITDA) 
are as compared with interest payment obligations. The fact that the Thai and Korean 
corporations had very low IPCs (2.7 and 2.1 respectively) should have signaled (and 
probably had signaled in 1997) to the creditors that the corporate financing system was 
getting fragile. In Taipei,China, on the other hand an IPC of 6.1 looked quite secure. 
However, fragility of corporate finance depends not only on leverage ratios or 
IPCs, but also on the actual performance of corporations.  The performance, as measured 
by sales and (to some extent) RoAs, did not seem problematic until the crisis. Since then, 
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Source: Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1998) (Interest payment coverage is equal to 
EBITDA/interest payment obligations) 
 
 























Policy and Institutional Questions  
 
Once we have the typology offered in section two of this paper it becomes possible to 
raise questions related to corporate governance structures for East Asia in a serious way. 
This is the task of this appendix. In particular, a set of policy and institutional issues can 
be raised clearly. 
Within the general framework presented in section 2 the most important question 
is: what corporate governance structure is the most appropriate for particular Asian 
countries, given the present stage of development and the present institutional structure in 
that country? In order to address this question properly a number of fairly concrete 
questions will need to be answered. The following list of institutional questions tries to do 
this without being exhaustive. This is done in three steps. First, a series of concrete 
questions related to the possible transition from a FBS to a BLS governance is listed. 
Second, some specific questions related to a possible transition from a FBS to an EMS 
governance structure are listed. Finally, a two-part question addresses the general policy 
issues for institutional restructuring. It is hoped that these questions will give specificity 
to the reform agenda, force one to think more clearly about concrete resource 
requirements, and most importantly, underline the problems of institutional change in the 
real world. As emphasized at the beginning, the purpose of the current paper is not to 
answer all these questions, but to use these to ascertain in a tentative and preliminary way 
what the significant problems are for transition to a better form of corporate governance 
in East Asia. 
 
 
A.  Questions related to Family-based System (FBS) and Bank-led System (BLS) 
 
1.  What circumstances may lead to overexposure of banks and non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFI) under the FBS to risky sectors (e.g. real estate) and risky projects? 
 
2.  What conditions can ensure that the transition from FBS to BLS and to a system of 
financial restraint (as Stiglitz and others have described it) will not lead to 
overlending to the risky sectors and projects? 
   50
3.  Are there problems that arise when the monitoring of corporations is primarily the 
responsibility of banks without being complemented by other financial institutions 
(Indonesia, South Korea)? 
 
4.  However, weak NBFIs also can cause problems (e.g. Thailand). What kind of policies 
and institutional reform can ensure that a transition from FBS to BLS in a country like 
Thailand will not cause the system to become vulnerable? Are there “cultural” factors 
(e.g. with respect to how laws are interpreted or applied) that may also be important 
here? 
 
5.  It has been claimed that unbalanced financial systems led to a lack of risk 
diversification in Asian economies. How will transitions to a BLS from FBS solve 
this problem? 
 
6.  Will allowing more foreign banks entry into the financial system make governance of 
BLS better? How? 
 
7.  What should be the optimal capital - adequacy ratios for banks over the relevant time 
horizons (e.g. during the crisis period, medium-term, long-run)? 
 
8.  How can legal lending limits be designed to be more adequate than they are now? 
 
9.  How can the enforcement of the legal lending limits be strengthened? 
 
10. How can asset classification systems be improved? 
 
11. How can provisioning rules for possible losses be better designed and enforced? 
 
12. How can the now universally acknowledged poor disclosure and transparency of bank 
operations be improved? 
 
13. a. How can the lack of provisions for an exit policy for troubled financial institutions 
be addressed? 
b. More specifically, is there a need for completely specifying an orderly workout 
procedure? If so, how to do it? (There may be issues related to legal institutions of 
specific countries that are relevant here. So institutional studies by legal experts will 
be necessary for answering this question) 
 
14. How to improve bank supervision, and the compliance with prudential regulations in 
general? 
 
15. It has been shown that much of the lending was done on a collateral basis, rather than 
on a cash flow basis. This obscured the need for analyzing the profitability and 
riskiness of underlying projects. How can this lending practice be changed? 
 
16. In the recent past, credit tended to flow to borrowers with relationships to government 
or private bank owners and to favored sectors. How much of this was productive?   51
What would be the best way to ensure that finances go to productive sectors and 
efficient firms after moving from FBS to BLS in these countries? 
 
17. How can banking practices be moved towards proper evaluation of illiquid vs. 
insolvent firms, lending based on projected cash flows, realistic sensitivity analysis 
and recoverable collateral values? 
 
18. What should be the optimal liquidity requirements (one presumes that in most cases it 
should be higher) for the banks in the affected countries? 
 
19. How to address the problems of special categories of weak financial institutions, e.g. 
a)  state banks in Indonesia 
b)  merchant banks in Korea 
c)  many other commercial banks in East Asia 
d)  finance companies in Thailand 
 
20. If the relationship between leverage and profitability is negative in East Asia, as some 
studies claim to have found, does this mean that BLS may not be the proper corporate 
governance structure in East Asia after all? 
 
21. How best can the problems of non-performing loans and bank-recapitalization be 
handled so that a move from FBS to BLS is a realistic option in the economies 
affected by the crisis? 
 
 
B.  Questions related to the possible transition from FBS to an Equity Market-led 
System (EMS) 
 
1.  The World Bank (1998) states: "The main lesson from the South East Asian crisis is 
that it is important to take an integrated approach to the issues of corporate 
governance and financing." Will transition to an EMS, under the existing conditions 
lead to this type of integrated approach and consequent "market disciplining" of 
corporate governance? 
 
2.  In particular, given ownership concentration in business groups and control by a few 
families, how can credible reform be carried out rapidly? 
 
3.  Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1998) have shown that interlocking structure of 
share ownership and pyramidal share ownership lead to greater effective block 
ownership and control in East Asian firms. How can this be changed?
17 
 
4.  Given the thinness of bond markets, what is the realistic time-frame in order for the 
countries of the region to be able to develop such markets with diverse type of bonds 
and sufficient market depth?
18 
                                                            
17 For some interesting evidence on shareholder activism in the Japanese context see Kim and Rhee (1999) 
18 This, in fact, is one of the most important policy issues in the medium run for Asia. I am grateful to 
Hitoshi Nishida and Toshio Karigane for helpful discussions regarding the development of bond markets   52
 
5.  What kind of regulatory reforms are necessary for reducing the agency costs and 
protecting the minority shareholders (and creating "shareholder value" in general) in 
an “institutionally-feasible” EMS structure of governance in East Asia? 
 
6.  Will increasing foreign presence in the equity market - especially the institutional 
investors - improve market discipline? Are there conditions such as 'bailing in' that 
may be important here? [Simply abolishing some laws, such as Thailand’s Alien 
Business Law may not be enough] 
 
7.  a. How helpful will the inclusion of outside directors (now being tried in South Korea, 
perhaps following the Cadbury and Hampel reports in U.K.) be in improving 
governance of the financial sectors and in turn the monitoring of the non-financial 
firms? 
b. How will it improve the governance and performance of non-financial firms 
directly? 
 
8.  Are the Takeover Codes adequate? If not (most likely they are not adequate) then how 
can these be improved? How long will it take? 
 
9.  a. How long will it take to review Securities Law adequately and suggest real changes 
(not just a hasty, window-dressing job)? 
b. How long will it take to clarify and enforce ownership rights in equity markets and 
creditor rights in the bond market? 
 
10. How to ensure that creditor rights are protected and management is appropriately 
disciplined in case of failure? 
 
11. How can bank shareholders be forced to bear the risk of bank failure and be 
encouraged to monitor the banks? 
 
12. Are proposals such as the one put forward by SET in Thailand for self-governance 
and monitoring put forth in 1997 credible? Can we compare with the Chilean reforms 
in corporate governance to get some clarity? How to evaluate the role of proposed 
rules (by outside experts) such as supermajority? 
 
13. How to carry out reforms such as de-leveraging through divestiture or sale of assets, 
streamlining of business units, operational restructuring and new equity infusion 
efficiency? 
14. Will reviewing the process of appointment of commissioners to the SEC and similar 
administrative reforms help? How to make these credible and feasible?  
 
15. Some institutional aspects (such as the slow speed of foreclosure as a result of slow 
court procedures and lack of registries in Thailand) make rapid reform difficult. How 
to speed up the pace of desirable reforms, esp. in areas such as bankruptcy procedures, 
DIP type of arrangements etc.? 
 
   53
C. Overall  questions 
 
3.  Ultimately, given the current political and economic situation and the existing 
institutional structures in the affected countries, what system of corporate governance 
will be the most efficient? Will the firm become a stakeholder firm (with managers, 
employees, shareholders all playing a role) or an Anglo-American type firm? Or will 
some kind of hybrid governance structure be the best? 
 
4.  Once we determine the answer to the above question, what specific policy measures 
will strategically be the most significant in helping the financial system navigate its 
way towards the optimal system?   54
Appendix (6) 
 
Some Theoretical Issues: Incomplete Contracts and Transactions Costs 
 
  While during the last two decades the term corporate governance – often 
associated with phenomena such as takeovers, financial restructuring and institutional 
investors’ activism- - has entered the business and economics vocabulary, it is curious to 
note that the standard classical textbook theory of the firm has no place for the term. This 
is because in this theory the firm is an entity that maximizes profit (by duality theorem, 
minimizes costs) subject to technological constraints given by the production function. 
The firm itself is really a black box that connects inputs to outputs efficiently. No 
assumptions are made with regards to the ownership of the firm beyond that of a general 
private ownership economy (Debreu, 1959). Therefore, possible conflicts between 
ownership and management identified by Berle and Means (1932) do not arise. 
Furthermore, under competitive conditions there is no economic rent to be divided among 
various parties ex post. Therefore, the issue of governance system – defined by 
Williamson (1985) as the set of constraints shaping the ex post bargaining over the quasi 
rents generated in an enterprise also does not arise.  
  Do things change if the firm is defined in a more realistic manner? Curiously, in a 
perfectly functioning contractual capitalism the answer is also no. Consider the definition 
of firm as a nexus of contracts. This is certainly a move towards greater realism. So the 
definition looks quite plausible, especially in the way that Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
develop it. Yet, if all contracts could be specified completely then there would be nothing 
unique left to the concept corporate governance. A complex set of contracts, written ex 
ante, would specify how to deal with every contingency, including the distribution of 
quasi-rents. 
  Faced with this difficulty some economists have defined the firm as a collection of 
physical assets that are jointly owned. This definition, introduced by Grossman and Hart 
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) starts from the position that not all contingencies can 
be covered by the initial set of contracts. Therefore, some way has to be found to confer 
rights of making decisions under exactly those contingencies that are unspecified in the 
initial contract as these contingencies are realized later. Therefore, ownership may matter   55
precisely because it legally entitles the owners to make such decisions. Owners are thus 
the residual rights holders (hence the approach has been also called the property rights 
view of the firm) and can appropriate the quasi-rents. It leads to a non-trivial definition of 
corporate governance, since the non-contractual element (i.e. the allocation of ownership) 
differentiates corporate governance from contractual governance, which can not be done 
within the complete contracts framework. Only in a world where contracts are incomplete 
– perhaps because some of them are contingent on future observable variables and either 
costly or impossible to write in advance – can there be some scope for governance ex post. 
In the world of incomplete contracts there are quasi-rents that must be divided ex post. 
This will involve real decisions to be made in the future. This contrasts sharply with the 
Arrow-Debreu world where all decisions (production, consumption and distribution) are 
made ex ante and no contracts can be renegotiated. 
  Notice that in the Arrow-Debreu context a very relevant real world question such 
as “in whose interest should the corporate directors act?” can not even be asked. The 
initial grand contract specifies completely how the board of directors should act under all 
contingencies. In the real world, as shown dramatically by the Asian crisis, the question 
has to be asked all the time. This makes the incomplete contracts and other related 
theoretical approaches relevant and appealing. In the Grossman-Hart-Moore view the 
residual rights of control are crucial because they allow ex post bargaining that can affect 
efficiency as well. 
  There are three principal ways in which corporate governance systems can affect 
efficiency. These can be called: 
 
1.  Ex ante incentive effects 
2.  Bargaining efficiency effects 
3.  Risk aversion aspects 
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Ex ante incentive effects 
  
  A classic example in business history discussed by Chandler and others is the 
Fisher Body case. In the 1920s this auto body manufacturer was asked by GM to locate 
its plants in close proximity to GM plants. The cost saving from lowered transportation 
costs and on-time delivery was quite obvious. However, locating close to GM would have 
meant that Fisher Body could not supply the other car manufacturers quite as easily and 
hence would have been in danger of becoming a ’captive’ of GM. Possibly, its weakened 
bargaining power under these circumstances would have led to a lower share of quasi-
rents generated by its relationship with GM (Klein et al. 1978). The dilemma was 
resolved ultimately when GM acquired Fisher Body. This acquisition, which changed the 
governance structure, led to more efficient plant location. Without a proper governance 
system individually rational agents will not devote the right amount of resources to value 
enhancing activities because they will not see their efforts as being properly rewarded. 
The phenomenon of managerial shirking can also be explained the same way.  
  Even more important perhaps is the fact that under an inappropriate governance 
system, rational agents will utilize resources in wasteful activities. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989) point out that a manager may inefficiently force the firm to specialize in activities 
that he is best at running because this will increase his share of ex post rents. 
Milgrom(1988) draws attention to the fact that even subordinates without decision 
making power will waste resources trying to curry favors with their superiors. Empire 
building by managers and their subordinates can at least partly be explained this way. 
Chandler’s (1966) description of capital allocation under Durand at GM as “a sort of 
horse trading” hints at this kind of problem. The move to the M-form, or multidivisional 
structure increased the responsibility and autonomy of the divisional managers. Their 
pay-offs from inefficient rent-seeking were reduced considerably. 
  Milgrom and Roberts (1990) discuss the presence of “influence costs” in many 
complex organizations. Organizational governance rules must be devised to minimize 
these influence costs. In a similar way Rajan and Zingales (1996, 1998) discuss the 
problems of inefficient "power-seeking". They argue that the more a firm's divisions have 
diverse investment opportunities the more severe is the problem of "inefficient power-
seeking". Not surprisingly, one of their findings is that the value of a diversified firm is   57
negatively correlated with the diversity of the investment profile of its divisions. This 
type of analysis may be directly relevant to an understanding of the East Asian 
conglomerates. 
 
Bargaining Efficiency Effects 
 
  Here we need to consider the problems of free-riding and of coordination costs, 
problems of information asymmetry between the different parties and liquidity constraints. 
  Consider a large and dispersed set of owners. Free-rider problems and the 
resulting failure to arrive at a collective decision may leave the managers free to 
appropriate the rent giving rise to 'agency and free cash flow problem' (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1980). One can also think of allocations of control 
rights under which no compensating transfers a la Coase theorem can be made because 
one of the parties is facing a liquidity constraint. (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). Rajan and 
Zingales (1996) also consider the possibility when there is no binding liquidity constraint 
but some agents have the alternative opportunity to invest in power-seeking activities. It 
is, therefore, quite possible that unless the governance structure generates the right 
incentives ex post bargaining could be inefficient. I will show later that this is a real 
possibility in the prevalent form of corporate governance in East Asia, under some 
circumstances. 
 
Risk Aversion Aspects 
 
  A governance system may affect both the level and allocation of risk in the 
economy. Any contract (for example an insurance contract) written in nominal terms 
generates some risk with respect to the future rate of inflation. If diversification of 
portfolio is impossible the expected value of surplus generated by the contractual 
arrangements will decrease. 
  Fama and Jensen (1983a and b) offer an interesting perspective on the generation 
and allocation of risk under different forms of organizational arrangements and corporate 
governance. According to their analysis the efficiency of a governance system can be 
measured by how well it allocates risk to the party most willing to bear the risk.   58
  The upshot of the above discussion is that a corporate governance system could be 
judged to be efficient from several points of view. Optimally, in order to enhance the total 
value creation by the corporate organizational form, the governance structure must create 
incentives for maximizing productive investments. Incidentally, this will also involve 
minimizing inefficient power seeking, and inefficiency in ex-post bargaining. A good 
governance system should also generate a minimal amount of risk and allocate this to 
those parties that are most willing and able to bear it.  
  The incomplete contracts framework of corporate governance is illuminating in 
underlining the value of governance. However, strictly speaking it applies only to 
entrepreneurial firms that are governed through shareholder activism. In order to 
understand the role of alternative governance structures we need to turn to alternatives 
that build on the insights of the incomplete contracts approach. In particular, relationship 
based forms of corporate governance need to be understood in the context of their being 
embedded in a larger non-contractual institutional matrix of social relations. To 
concretize matters we need here an expanded typology and conceptual framework. The 
idea of a family-based corporate governance system in the East Asian context discussed 
in section III is a preliminary step in this direction. In order to proceed more logically in 
this direction, however, some further distinctions must be made to begin with the 
difference between reforming exclusively the rules of corporate governance in a formal 
way and actually changing the institutional arrangements in practice must be recognized. 
In particular, the critical role of transactions costs in effecting institutional changes must 





A Transactions Cost Perspective 
 
It is important to realize fully the strategic nature of the transactions costs during 
the transition period. As Williamson (1995) has pointed the choice during transition is not 
between two sets of idealized institutions, but rather between and existing set and 
different strategies to change the systems to a better one. Khan and Lippit (1993a, b) also   59
emphasized the role of uncertainty and bounded rationality of agents in defining any kind 
of after reform steady-state institutional set up.
19 
As the text points out (section 4) the enabling environment of either a transparent 
and effective legal system or a workable relationship between the government and 
business is necessary for corporations to perform efficiently. When legal institutions are 
not well-developed transaction costs are high in dealing with market situations. It may be 
necessary to have relatively large family groups with their particular modus operandi in 
order to function in this environment. For example, through their intra-group network and 
their relationships with the government bureaucracy the family groups may be able to 
economize on transaction costs. 
  A similar argument applies with respect to the 'diversification discount' 
issue. In the literature on diversification in the developed economies the empirical 
findings show that on the average a loss of value of about five percent is recorded by 
companies that diversify beyond two segments. This loss, which has been called the 
'diversification discount' is attributed to the loss of efficiency when a firm goes beyond its 
core competencies. However, in the Asian context, at an earlier stage of development 
transactions costs may be minimized by internalization through diversification. In other 
words the boundary between the firm and the market are extended from the firm which 
grows 'inclusively' by acquiring other firms. 
  Beyond this specific hypothesis, theoretically, the transactions costs 
economics (TCE) regards transaction as the basic unit of analysis (Williamson, 1988). 
The incomplete contracts approach discussed earlier, and agency theory (AT) in general 
takes the individual agent as "the elementary unit of analysis". Both offer micro-
foundations of economic behavior; however, TCE "leads naturally to an examination of 
the principal dimensions with respect to which transactions differ". (Williamson, 1988, p. 
571). This is crucial in analyzing institutions with different enabling (or disabling) 
environments. Thus adaptation (or maladaptation) to a specific environment becomes a 
key institutional issue, as does governance with respect to specific structure of firms, their 
asset specificities, and the interrelation of the various stakeholders. All these must be 
thought of in the real world policy context of concrete institutional analysis and the 
                                                            
19 Khan and Lippit (1993 a, b) consider the specific problem of defining a steady state under environmental 
constraints. However, their treatment of bounded rationality and uncertainty can be carried over to other   60
various transactions costs.
20 Given the costs of failed (or even successful) reforms it is 
important to pay attention to these costs. As Williamson reminds us: “All over the world, 
we’re launching projects that have great potential for doing irreversible economic and 
political damage… We can’t afford the experiment of developing five countries in five 
different ways and seeing which four countries get ruined. Instead, it will cost us much 
less in the long run if we hire institutional economists to find out what happened the last 
time.” (Williamson, 1995, p. 194) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
relevant contexts. 
20 Williamson (1988) discusses four types of ex post costs. In his words: "[t]hese include "(1) the 
maladaptation costs incurred when transactions drift out of alignment in relation to what Masahiko Aoki 
refers to as the 'shifting contract curve', (2) the haggling costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to 
correct ex post misalignments, (3) the setup and running costs associated with the governance structures 
(often not the courts) to which disputes are referred, and (4) the bonding costs of effecting secure 
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